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or  
A Tale of Heroic Assumptions in 
Two Acts 
 
Act 1: the problem of students 
going to the wrong universities 
 
Act 2: the wrong universities 
failing the students 
Context: Green Paper and the market 
• TEF and differentiation by price 
• Supply and demand - new entry and exit 
mechanisms 
• Degree Awarding Powers 
• University Title 
• The 'failing university' 
• consultation closed 15th January 2016... 
rumours of a HE White Paper before June 
Differentiation and competition 
Marketisation of HE systems is based on 
institutional differentiation 
Differentiation can appear in indicators of value, 
quality and prestige (vertical differentiation) 
or  
In different types of HE: by discipline; by 
learning mode; by relevance to labour markets 
(horizontal differentiation) 
Vertical differentiation: 'better than' 
way of seeing sector 
• from Oxbridge at the top to the 'bog standard ex-
Poly' and FE college  at the base 
• League tables show how institutions compare on 
a linear scale 
- entry requirements 
- staff-student ratios 
- proportion achieving good degrees 
- income from research 
- no. of post-grad students 
– TEF scores? price?? 
 
Horizontal differentiation: 'different to' 
way of seeing and valuing the sector 
 
Higher education 
Learning 
type  
academic ---distance--vocational---- work based learning 
inst. type university --------- specialist institution -------polytechnic  
social aim social mobility -------- ---widen participation for all 
underrepresented groups 
policy aim fair access --------------------------------------- system diversity 
workforce  philosophers --- lawyers ------engineers------ nurses--?? 
Horizontal differentiation encouraged 
in policy 
A diverse HE service should be able to provide choices 
of curriculum offer; choices as to the mode, pace and 
place of delivery; choices regarding the physical and 
intellectual environment available; and choices 
between a range of different institutional forms and 
missions.  
 
(HEFCE: 2000, para 14).   
Context of English access policy 
Policy shift since 2000 
• steadily more pro-competition policy 2003 HE 
Act; Browne Review 2009; 2011 White Paper 
• Overtly marketised - attempts to create a price 
differential 
– AAB+ 
– expansion of New Alternative Providers 
– lifting the cap 2015-16 
– Green Paper 
 
Overt marketisation  
• League tables emerge mid-2000s 
• Browne review of student finance (2009) 
• Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition (2010-15) - fee 
increase 
• 2011 White Paper 'students at the heart of the system' 
– variable fee market 
– driven by student choice based on information 
– best institutions can expand numbers of higher qualified 
students 
– weaker institutions would have to lower fees to maintain 
numbers 
Act 1: the problem of 
students going to the 
wrong universities 
 
Students at the Heart of the System (BIS 2011) 
Key information sets = informed choice 
redistribution of 'brightest students' to 'best 
institutions' 
market levers - AAB+ equivalents - expanded 
outside the SNC but within the overall capped 
numbers 
the other margin - 'competing on price and quality' 
- also outside the SNC 
Discourses of division: the 2011 White 
Paper 
... ͞We ǁill ŵoǀe aǁaǇ froŵ the tight Ŷuŵďer ĐoŶtrols that ĐoŶstraiŶ 
individual higher education institutions, so that there is a more dynamic 
sector in which popular institutions can grow. ..... We propose to allow 
unrestrained recruitment of high achieving students, scoring the equivalent 
of AAB or above at A-Level. Core allocations for all institutions will be 
adjusted to remove these students. Institutions will then be free to recruit as 
many of these students as wish to come. 
 ..... This should allow greater competition for places on the more selective 
courses and create the opportunity for more students to go to their first 
choice institution if that university wishes to take them".  
͞The seĐoŶd eleŵeŶt is the ĐreatioŶ of a fleǆiďle ŵargiŶ of aďout ϮϬ,ϬϬϬ 
places in 2012/13 to support expansion by providers who combine good 
quality with value for money and whose average charge (after waivers have 
ďeeŶ takeŶ iŶto aĐĐouŶtͿ is at or ďeloǁ £ϳ,ϱϬϬ.͟  ;BI“ ϮϬϭϭ: paras ϰ.ϭϴ; ϰ.ϭϵ; 
4.20)  
 
AAB+ and the 'heroic' assumptions 
• The 'most popular' institutions would expand 
by enrolling more students with higher grades  
• Applicants would read the market signals (KIS) 
and make better informed choices 
• Other HEIs would have to reduce tuition fees 
to compensate for lost AAB+ students 
 
 
 
How the fee market was supposed 
to work 
£9k maximum 
£6k basic fee 
Planned average 
fee (modelling) 
£7.5k 
So what actually happened? 
The 'most popular' universities didn't expand their high grades 
numbers 
No reported shift of AABs from post92s to pre92s  
BTEC demand remained high in post-92s 
 
Issue created for pre-1992s 
 
Any expansion of 'high grades' students would shrink the core 
SNC, in some cases to 20% of overall (capped) places (ABB+ from 
2013/14) 
 
(Taylor & McCaig report for HEA,2014; McCaig & Taylor Strange 
Death of Number Controls, Studies in HE, 2015) 
 
  
The squeezed core SNC:  
What has this meant at a 'typical'  Pre92 
institution?  
 
SNC  
100% 
SNC 
40% 
AAB + 
60% 
2011/12     2012/13 
 
SNC
20% 
  
+ 
ABB+ 
80% 
No SNC 
    2013/14 2015/16 
The great non-migration 
 
• Most 'high grades' students are in STEM and 
medicine (mostly offered by pre-92s) 
• 22 HEIs with > 50% AAB+* 
• 17 were Russell Group, 5 Specialist Institutions* 
• Most AABs in post-92 sector were BTEC 
• Few 'selective' HEIs accept BTECs  
 
 
 
(*HEFCE 2011 modelling of AABs) 
 
 
 
Unintended consequences of 
misreading the market 
 
• Subject breadth was threatened among some 
of most selective HEIs as AAB became ABB 
• ... especially courses that are in high demand 
from traditional applicants whose choice is 
supposedly sovereign 
• e.g. humanities, social sciences, MFL, arts 
• Led to centralised admissions systems clawing 
back numbers 
 
Impact on post-1992s: risk averse 
behaviours 
• raising of entry requirements  
• dropping of lower entry, sub-degree and part-
time courses  
• survey reported they expected age profile to 
lower and negative effect on social diversity 
• emphasis on employability 
• 90 institutions chasing a place in the 'Top 50' 
 
Act 2: the wrong universities failing 
the students 
 
• The Green Paper = marketisation v.2 
• TEF - using teaching quality to open up price 
differential 
• UT, DAP, failure and exit - using market entry to 
open up price differential 
• New providers = increase the supply, meet and 
exceed the demand = price should fall 
• Loan outlay and thus public expenditure exposure 
reduced 
Is there are a quality problem? 
 
• "BIS are trying to solve real problems of 
quality and regulation. But it is not clear they 
have figured out how and there is a risk that 
the bodies and rules they will establish in 
legislation will not solve teaching quality".  
Briefing memo seen carried into No.10 Downing 
Street (April 2016) 
Opening the sector to new providers 
 
Widening the range of high quality higher education 
providers stimulates competition and innovation, 
increases choice for students, and can help to deliver 
better value for money. Our aspiration is to remove all 
unnecessary barriers to entry into higher education, and 
move from parallel systems to a level playing field, with a 
clearer choice for students... 
Higher education in England rightly has an excellent 
global reputation, and we must ensure that reputation is 
maintained. (BIS 2015, p.42) 
 
 
 
Provider exit 
 
Recent reforms to higher education policy are changing the shape of the sector. Prior 
to 2010, fluctuation in the sector was limited, the sector was very stable, and so the 
need for a provider to exit has historically been very low. But the 2011 reforms 
created a much more open sector, and allowed significant numbers of alternative 
providers to expand their student cohort and compete directly with other providers 
for the first time.  
 
In a changing and more competitive sector, providers that innovate and present a 
more compelling value proposition to students will be able to increase their share of 
total students – in some cases this may be at the expense of other institutions.  
 
Continuing to support providers that are struggling is undesirable for various reasons. 
Difficulty attracting students or poor quality provision would not be in the long term 
interest of students, and could damage the reputation of the sector. Removing 
provision may indeed lead to it being replaced by higher quality provision.  
................  However, there may be limited circumstances where it might make sense to 
support an institution on a temporary basis, for example in a location where there are 
no other higher education providers in the area, and to give time for an orderly exit.  
(BIS 2015, pp.54-55) 
 
 
 
Student protection...? 
 
The outcomes Government will want to see are that students and the 
reputation of the sector are protected as well as minimising any impact on 
public finances. This student protection should primarily be focused on 
academic continuity ..... but failing that could be financial (i.e. recompense 
which protects the student from complete financial loss, which may include 
tuition fees, maintenance etc.). In designing student protection, we would 
seek to ensure that the regime does not create unnecessary barriers to exit.  
The contingency arrangements would be expected to apply in any type of 
course closure or exit, and should cover the following:  
• Continuity of provision for the student – offer the student an alternative 
course or support them in organising an alternative course at another 
provider – which the student accepts.  ....  [e.g. through] collaborative or 
bilateral agreements with other institutions or awarding body  
if a student does not accept a new place, then the provider must give the 
student a rebate for the (unspent prepaid tuition fees) with recompense 
being made in the same way it was paid (direct to student if directly paid or to 
SLC if it was a loan). .....  Any such requirement would need to be carefully 
designed so as not to create a barrier to new entrants. (BIS 2015, p.55) 
 
 
 
 
Implications 
• Low cost provision - more competition - zero 
sum? 
• Access for underrepresented groups - will they 
accumulate at 'the bottom' of distribution? 
• Transfer for students' whose institution has 
'failed' - Credit Accumulation and Transfer 
back on the agenda? 
• Staffing? insecurity, casualisation, risk-averse 
provision and pedagogy 
Reading 
BIS (2011) Students at the heart of the system, HMSO, March 2011 
BIS (2015) Fulfilling our potential: Teaching excellence, social mobility and student 
choice, HMSO, November 2015 
McCaig, C & Taylor, CA (2015) The strange death of Number Controls in England: 
paradoxical adventures in higher education market making. Studies in Higher 
Education. Published online 7th December 2015 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2015.1113952 
Taylor, C. and McCaig, C. (2014) Evaluating the impact of number controls, choice and 
competition: an analysis of the student profile and the student learning environment in 
the new higher education landscape, Higher Education Academy, York, August 2014. 
https://www.heacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/resources/impact_of_number_contr
ols_choice_and_competition.pdf 
 
